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Communication based on informational asymmetries abounds in politics, business, and
almost any other form of social interaction. Informational asymmetries may create
incentives for the better-informed party to exploit her advantage by misrepresenting
information. Using a game-theoretic setting, we investigate the neural basis of deception
in human interaction. Unlike in most previous fMRI research on deception, the
participants decide themselves whether to lie or not. We find activation within the right
temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ), the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the (pre)cuneus
(CUN), and the anterior frontal gyrus (aFG) when contrasting lying with truth telling.
Notably, our design also allows for an investigation of the neural foundations of
sophisticated deception through telling the truth—when the sender does not expect the
receiver to believe her (true) message. Sophisticated deception triggers activation within
the same network as plain lies, i.e., we find activity within the rTPJ, the CUN, and aFG.
We take this result to show that brain activation can reveal the sender’s veridical intention
to deceive others, irrespective of whether in fact the sender utters the factual truth or not.
Keywords: deception, sophisticated deception, fMRI experiment, temporo-parietal junction, strategic interactions,
habenula
INTRODUCTION
Communication based on informational asymmetries abounds in
politics, business, and almost any other form of social interac-
tion. Such situations may provide an incentive for either party
to exploit the informational asymmetries to their own advan-
tage. This may then imply the use of deception. Although there
is some debate about a coherent and generally accepted defini-
tion, typically experimental (neuroscientific) investigations are
based on a conceptual definition of deception as a deliberate act
that is “intended to foster in another person a belief or under-
standing which the deceiver considers false [. . .]. Specifically, the
deceiver transmits a false message (while hiding the true informa-
tion) [. . . ]” (Zuckerman et al., 1981, p. 3). Consider, for example,
customers in a restaurant who ask the waiter if the lobster is
fresh. The waiter may care only about the customers’ well-being,
and answer truthfully. Alternatively, she may be motivated by the
restaurant’s need to get rid of the less fresh lobsters and answer
untruthfully. Informational asymmetries often provide an incen-
tive for the better-informed party to exploit her informational
advantage by holding back information from another party, thus
involving some sort of lying or misrepresentation of information.
Yet, wrongly informing the interaction partner about the true
nature of a situation is only one form of deception and excludes
other important deceptive acts, such as sophisticated deception
(Sutter, 2009). By taking into account the sender’s thoughts about
the receiver’s belief, sending a truemessage can also be classified as
a form of deception. Particularly, the sender may tell the receiver
about the true state of the world, hoping she will think the sender
is lying and will therefore not act according to the information
provided. For instance, think of opposing parties in war. Here,
a sophisticated lie would be to tell the enemy exactly what you
are going to do, hoping the opponent will think you are lying
and will therefore not act according to the information you pro-
vide. In contrast, a plain lie would mean sending the wrong
information, such as pretending to invade the other’s territory
at a different location from where the attack is actually carried
out. Accordingly, sophisticated deception and simple deception
can be delineated along the dimensions “truth of the proposi-
tion” (true vs. false) and “the sender’s belief about the receiver’s
expectation” (to be deceived vs. not to be deceived), whereas the
intention of the sender is in both cases to deceive the receiver. In
contrast, sophisticated deception can be delineated from plainly
telling the truth along the dimensions “intention of the sender”
(to deceive vs. not to deceive) and “the sender’s belief about the
receiver’s expectation” (to be deceived vs. not to be deceived).
Together, sophisticated deception can be thought of as some sort
of a hybrid, it conveys literally the truth, but is intended (and
expected) to be perceived as a lie.
In this paper, we analyze the neural foundations of sim-
ple as well as sophisticated deception in strategic interac-
tions. Particularly, we ask whether brain activation patterns can
reveal the sender’s true intention and can disentangle the two
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forms of deception, namely simple and sophisticated decep-
tion. By using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI),
we can derive qualitative and quantitative predictions for brain
activation patterns that can help to contrast different candi-
date strategies that may not be evident from behavioral data
alone.
As outlined above and put forward repeatedly for deception in
interactive contexts (cp.meta-analysis by Lisofsky et al., 2014), the
intention to deceive requires the sender to anticipate the receiver’s
mental state and thus think about her beliefs and expectations.
Building on the notion that telling the truth is some sort of base-
line (Cui et al., 2014), we propose that the intention to deceive
the interaction partner, regardless of how it is expressed even-
tually, requires additional socio-cognitive processes than does
telling the truth. This should also be reflected by longer reac-
tion times for both sorts of deceptive behavior when compared
to truth telling as well as be reflected on the phenomenological
level (i.e., senders’ reports). Therefore, we expect increased neural
activation when comparing simple and sophisticated deception
to plainly telling the truth specifically within regions that have
been associated with theory of mind (ToM) processes, such as
the right temporo-parietal junction (rTJP), including the pos-
terior superior temporal gyrus/angular gyrus (Frith and Frith,
1999; Vogeley et al., 2001; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Decety and
Lamm, 2007; Wolf et al., 2010) and with social cognition, such
as the temporal pole (TP) (Moriguchi et al., 2006; Frith, 2007;
for a review see Olson et al., 2007). The hypothesized activa-
tion pattern reflecting the intention to deceive (TPJ, TP) shall
also be observed for sophisticated deception when compared to
plain truth trials. Therefore, we could distinguish the two forms
of sending objectively true messages and unfold the sender’s true
(deceptive) intention. Finding activation within areas reflecting
socio-cognitive processes specifically for deceptive behavior (irre-
spective of how it unfolds) as compared to truth telling would be
novel and taken to indicate the specific requirement of such pro-
cesses for deception in strategic interactions. In other words, if
the outcome of the interaction depends on both, the sender and
the receiver, deceptive behavior—undertaken to get a (monetary)
advantage—requires other processes than solely saying the truth
and therewith accepting the outcome of the interaction without
any attempts to influence it.
For plain lies (as compared to plainly telling the truth) we
expect (in addition to TPJ and TP) activation within the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC). A recent quantitative meta-analysis on
deceptive behavior in social interactive paradigms (Lisofsky et al.,
2014) suggested this activation “to indicate greater conflict pro-
cessing during deception in social situations in which people are
especially supposed to behave honestly” (p. 119). This ACC acti-
vation for plain lies is expected to vary depending on the intensity
of conflict, which we define as the product of the differences of
the sender’s and the receiver’s monetary payoffs.
Taking into account the sender’s true intention, allows us (for
the first time) to specifically investigate the neural correlates of
genuine truth trials. In none of the previous imaging studies on
deception did the authors report any specific activation pattern
for telling the truth. If this was due to truth trials being a het-
erogeneous category (for instance, including truth trials with the
intention to deceive), we shall find a specific activation pattern for
telling the truth in this study.
Studying deception in strategic interaction requires partici-
pants be given a choice of whether to deceive another person,
because only when they have a choice can we find out the circum-
stances under which subjects will resort to deception (Abe et al.,
2007; Greene and Paxton, 2009; Sip et al., 2010; for a review see
Sip et al., 2008). For this reason, paying participants according to
their choices—as is standard in experimental economics (Smith,
1976)—is important. Accordingly, in the present study partici-
pants played a simple sender-receiver game (Crawford and Sobel,
1982; Gneezy, 2005). In this two-person game, the sender (e.g.,
the waiter in the introductory example) is informed about two
possible states of the world (the lobster is fresh or not) that yield
particular payoffs for the sender and the receiver (the customer).
The sender can send a message to the receiver that is either true
or false with respect to which state of the world is more profitable
for the receiver. Based on this message, the receiver makes a deci-
sion (whether to order the lobster or not), thus determining the
payoffs for the sender and the receiver. That is, the monetary pay-
off for the sender highly depends on whether she is successful in
making the receiver believe her. We assume the receiver cannot
figure out whether the message is true (e.g., the customer can-
not retaliate if he finds out the lobster was bad). This is different
from a recent paper on the neural circuitry of a broken promise
in which the person sending a promise was also the person mak-
ing the decision about whether to keep the promise (Baumgartner
et al., 2009). In our context, sending a message is the only action
the sender can take and thus the only way in which she might
influence the receiver. Taken together, our paradigm addresses
widespread concerns around ecological validity of experiments
on deception in that it is truly interactive, participants have a real
opportunity to deceive another person who is not a confederate,
and participants’ payoffs (in the role of the sender) depend fully
on the decision of the receiver. Moreover, due to the specificity
that the receiver cannot find out whether the sender had sent a
wrong message or not allows us to investigate deceptive behavior
in strategic interactions that is unaffected by learning and adap-
tation effects. It is for the latter reason that we give no feedback
to receivers about the actual options from which the sender could
choose from.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-four (17 women, mean age = 24.3 years, SD = 2.6,
range = 21–32 years) right-handed1 , healthy volunteers (without
any neurological or psychiatric history) participated in the fMRI
experiment for a payment of 12 Euro per hour. Additionally to
this show-up fee, participants could earn up to 30 Euros. That is,
at the end of the experiment, one trial was randomly drawn and
1In recent years, a vast number of imaging studies have shown that there
are marked differences in the neural localization of cognitive (and especially
language) functions in the brains of left-handed individuals when compared
with right-handers. To exclude a putative effect of lateralization correlated
with handedness we had chosen to only include right-handers in our imaging
study.
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FIGURE 1 | This is how we presented the payoffs in the two states of the
world to the sender. Tables A1–A3 in the Appendix list all 90 games.
Example matrices of the sender-receiver paradigm are given for the three
conditions “conflict” (A), “sender indifferent” (B), and “aligned interest” (C).
The sender is shown a specific payoff matrix and can send either of two
messages: “Red is more profitable for you.” Or “Blue is more profitable for
you.” After response selection and on the next screen, the participant has to
answer the following question: “Which state do you expect the receiver to
choose? The red column or the blue column?” Importantly, the sender’s
message does not have a direct impact on the payoffs for both players in any
of the states. Rather, the receiver’s choice is eventually implemented for
payment.
paid out according to the receiver’s choice in this specific trial.
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, spoke
German as their native language, and none had irremovable metal
implants in their bodies. The experimental procedure and data
collection followed the ethical guidelines of the “Declaration of
Helsinki” (revised version, 2012) and were approved by the local
ethical committee of the University of Cologne. Data were han-
dled anonymously. We had to exclude four participants (1 male
and 3 female) from the analysis because of too few lying or sophis-
ticated deception trials, respectively, and one participant because
of zero truth trials.
STIMULI AND EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
In the sender-receiver game, there are two players of which only
the sender (the person being scanned) is informed about the
monetary consequences for herself and the receiver for two dif-
ferent options, one being associated with Blue color and the other
with Red color. Let Blue (Sb, Rb) represent the payoff to the sender
and the receiver, respectively, from choosing Blue, and Red (Sr,
Rr) from choosing Red (cp. Figure 1). After being informed about
these pairs of payoffs, the sender sends a message to the receiver,
saying either “Blue is more profitable for you” or “Red is more
profitable for you.” After sending a message, the sender has to
indicate on a new screen which state she expects the receiver to
pick. Then the next trial started. All in all, 90 games were played
that differed with respect to the relative gains and losses for the
two players (see below).
We call a choice a sophisticated deception when a sender sent
the true message expecting the receiver not to follow it. We denote
as a true message a case in which a sender sent the true message
and expects the receiver to follow it by picking the state the mes-
sage indicated as more profitable. We classify as simple deception
cases in which the sender sent the false message. After receiving
the message from the sender, the receiver chooses Blue or Red,
and the respective payoffs are recorded (cp. Table 1).
While the sender underwent the anatomical scanning session
(to obtain the individual anatomical structures onto which the
metabolic activity map was projected), the receiver played the
Table 1 | Performance refers to the answer to the first question:
“Which option (blue or red) is more profitable for Player 2?”;
intention to deceive refers to the answer to the second question:
“Which state do you expect the receiver to choose? The red column
or the blue column?”
Performance: Intention: intention Trial
honest answer? to deceive? classification
Yes No Plain truth
Yes Sophisticated deception
No Yes Simple deception
No Not classifiable (ignored)
game in another room, which was located across campus, and
it was ensured that sender and receiver never met each other.
This was done to exclude any effects that might arise as a con-
sequence of attractiveness, sympathy, gender, or the like. After
the receiver finished her part (which was approximately at the
time the scanning session of the sender was finished), one trial
was randomly picked by the experimenter and the correspond-
ing payoff (additional to the show-up fee of 12 Euros/h) was
paid out to the sender and the receiver according to the receiver’s
choice. The mean additional payout for senders was C8.53 (SD =
5.54), ranging from 5 to 20 Euros; the mean additional pay-
out for receivers was C8.26 (SD = 6.15), ranging from 0 to 25,
not being significantly different [t(58) = 0.176, p = 0.861]. The
full set of instructions is provided in the Appendix and both,
sender and receiver, knew about the entire procedure before start-
ing the experimental session (see A.1 and A.2 in Supplementary
Material).
In each of the 90 games, the sender was asked to send one of
the above messages to the receiver. One of these messages was
always true and the other was false. Knowing only the message she
received and not the potential payoffs in each state, the receiver
had to pick either Blue or Red, which then determined the pay-
offs for the sender and the receiver. Since the receiver was only
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informed about her actual payoff in the chosen state—and not
about the sender’s actual payoff or the possible payoffs in the un-
chosen state—the receiver could not judge whether the sender
had told the truth or not. Yet, the receiver was informed that
the maximum profits for her and the sender was 30 Euros. It
was important that the receiver did not know about the poten-
tial payoffs in each state (but only the payoff of the actually chosen
option in the current trial), otherwise she would have adjusted her
behavior, thus confounding objectivity and comparability (within
and across participants) as well as affecting the sender’s strategic
behavior. Likewise, to exclude learning and order effects on the
side of the sender’s behavior, the sender did not learn about the
decisions of the receiver.
We varied the incentives for deception along three differ-
ent categories for the 90 games, indicating the possible ten-
sion between the sender’s and receiver’s payoffs (i.e., stimulus-
dependent categorization independent of participants’ choice). In
the category “conflict” (n = 45), the more profitable state for the
sender was always less profitable for the receiver. We also var-
ied the relative gains and losses of the sender and the receiver
between the two states of a game. In category “sender indifferent”
(n = 27), the sender earned the same amount of money in both
states, but the receiver payoff differed across states, and it could
be higher or lower than the sender’s payoff. Category “aligned
interests” (n = 18) included only pairs of states in which one
state yielded higher profits both for the sender and the receiver,
although the increase in payoffs from the worse to the better state
could differ for sender and receiver. The order of presentation of
games was randomized. The full set of games is provided in the
Appendix (see A.3 in Supplementary Material).
All trials lasted for 16 s (i.e., 8 scans at TR= 2 s): the game with
its monetary payoffs was presented for a maximum of 8 s, dur-
ing which time participants could respond, followed by a short
fixation (2 s) and then the question about the sender’s expec-
tation (4 s). Subsequently, the announcement that the next trial
was about to start was presented for 2 s. To help to characterize
the shape of the hemodynamic response function, the timing of
the presentation of the stimulus was varied. Accordingly, using
a jittering-method more points of the hemodynamic response
function can be sampled than if a fixed inter-stimulus-interval
was used. Particularly, we randomly varied the onset of each stim-
ulus presentation relative to the beginning of the first of the eight
scans (0, 400, 800, 1200, 1600ms) to enhance the temporal res-
olution of the signal captured (Miezin et al., 2000; Birn et al.,
2002).
MR SCANNING PROCEDURE
Image acquisition
Imaging was performed on a 3T scanner (Siemens TRIO,
Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a standard birdcage head
coil. Participants lay supine in the scanner with their hands
placed on a right and left response button box. The index fingers
were placed on two appropriate response buttons and partic-
ipants were trained about the response contingencies. Form-
fitting cushions were used to prevent participants from head
movement and they were provided with earplugs to attenu-
ate the scanner noise. The experiment was presented via a
mirror that was mounted to the headcoil and individually
adjusted.
One of the areas, in which we expected activation, is the TP.
This area is subject to severe distortion and signal loss in fMRI due
to susceptibility artifacts that result from the area’s specific loca-
tion, i.e., near air-filled sinuses (Ojemann et al., 1997). Therefore,
we used a spin-echo (SE) sequence which has been shown to
be less sensitive to susceptibility-related signal dropouts as in
contrast to gradient-echo (GE) sequences (Norris et al., 2002;
Schmidt et al., 2005). Yet, the drawback of using SE-based instead
of GE-based fMRI is a lower statistical power of the SE sequences.
During functional imaging, 17 axial slices (4mm thickness,
25% spacing, field of view [FOV] 21 cm, data matrix of 64 × 64
voxels, and in-plane resolution of 3.3 × 3.3mm) covering the
whole brain were collected using a single-shot SE echo-planar
imaging (SE-EPI) sequence (TR 2 s, echo time [TE] 80ms, flip
angle 90◦) sensitive to blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD)
contrast. One functional run with 728 timepoints was run with
each time point sampling over the 17 slices. After the functional
imaging, high-resolution 3D T1-weighted whole brain MDEFT
sequences (128 sagittal slices, 1mm thickness) were recorded.
Image processing and analysis
The functional imaging data were processed and analyzed using
the software package LIPSIA (Leipzig Image Processing and
Statistical Inference Algorithms) version 2.2 (Lohmann et al.,
2001). To correct for temporal offsets between the slices acquired
in one scan, a cubic-spline interpolation was used. Thereafter
the data were motion-corrected with the 50th time-step as a ref-
erence and 6 degrees of freedom (3 translational, 3 rotational).
A temporal high-pass filter with a cutoff frequency of 1/120Hz
was used to remove low-frequency signal changes and baseline
drifts and a spatial Gaussian filter with 6mm full-width half-
maximum (FWHM) was applied. A rigid linear registration with
6 degrees of freedom (three rotational, three translational) was
performed to align the functional data slices with a 3D stereotac-
tic coordinate reference system. The rotational and translational
parameters were acquired on the basis of the MDEFT slices to
achieve an optimal match between these slices and the 3D ref-
erence data dataset. The MDEFT volume data was standardized
to the MNI atlas. The rotational and translational parameters
were subsequently transformed by linear scaling to the same stan-
dard size. The resulting parameters were then used to transform
the functional slices employing a trilinear interpolation, so that
the resulting functional slices were aligned with the stereotac-
tic coordinate system. Resulting data had a spatial resolution of
3 × 3 × 3mm (27mm3).
The statistical evaluation was based on a least-squares esti-
mation using the general linear model (GLM) for serially auto-
correlated observations (Friston et al., 1995; Worsley and Friston,
1995). The design matrix was generated with a delta function,
convolved with the hemodynamic response function (gamma
function) (Glover, 1999). We used two different design matri-
ces to answer the different research questions. One design matrix
comprised the following events: truth trials, simple deception tri-
als, and sophisticated deception trials (cp. Table 1). The trials
were classified based on participants’ behavior, i.e., their choice
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which message to send to the receiver and their response to the
question “Which state do you expect the receiver to choose?”
Events were modeled time-locked to the beginning of a game.
The duration was modeled individually with the time it took par-
ticipants to respond to the game (RT) (Grinband et al., 2008)
and with amplitude of one. In another design matrix that was
used to model and investigate the effects of conflict (defined as
the tension between the sender’s and receiver’s payoffs), we had
five regressors, particularly, truth trials, simple deception trials,
and sophisticated deception trials with their duration being mod-
eled individually by RT and amplitude of one plus two regressors
for simple deception trials and sophisticated deception trials that
were modeled with their individual RT and an amplitude that
reflected the tension between the sender’s and receiver’s payoffs.
The tension to deceive was calculated as the product of the dif-
ferences of the sender’s and the receiver’s payoff for the pairs of
states, i.e., (Sb – Sr)∗(Rr – Rb) (cp. description of stimulus mate-
rial and Figure 1). For instance, let Sb = 15, Sr = 5, Rr = 15,
and Rb = 5, then the value representing the tension between the
player’s payoffs is (15 – 5) × (15 – 5) = 100. In contrast, for a
matrix with the payoffs Sb = 1, Sr = 0, Rr = 5, and Rb = 0, the
conflict value is low ((1 – 0) × (5 – 0) = 5). This value repre-
sents the product of the difference of the profit of the sender and
the corresponding inverted difference of the receiver. This means
that if the differences have opposite signs, then the sender and the
receiver have conflicting interests. In case the differences have the
same sign, both the sender and the receiver gain higher profits in
the same state. If the sender is indifferent between the two states,
the parameter value is zero. Hence, this conflict parameter reflects
a measure of the tension to deceive.
For each participant, contrast images were generated on the
basis of beta-value estimates of the raw-score differences between
specified conditions. Subsequently, these single subject contrasts
were entered into a second-level analysis on the basis of Bayesian
statistics (Neumann and Lohmann, 2003; Lazar, 2008). In the
approach by Neumann and Lohmann (2003), posterior proba-
bility maps and maps of the effect size are calculated on the basis
of the resulting least-square estimates of parameters for the GLM.
That is, the parameter estimates on the second level of analysis
are viewed within a Bayesian framework as evidence for the pres-
ence or absence of the effect of interest in a group of participants.
The output of the Bayesian second-level analysis is a probabil-
ity map showing the probability for the contrast to be larger
than zero. This Bayesian technique allows us to directly estimate
the probability of a specific difference in the group means given
the parameter estimates of the GLM for the individual partici-
pants. This is more informative than a classical rejection of a null
hypothesis. This approach has the further advantage, when com-
pared with conventional analyses based on t statistics, of being less
sensitive to outliers than traditional t statistics, as the influence
of individual participants on a group statistic is weighted by the
within-subject variability. In support of this, Thirion et al. (2007)
suggested that, from the point of view of reliability, optimal
statistical thresholds for activation maps are lower than classi-
cal thresholds corrected for multiple comparisons. Furthermore,
since probabilities of the contrasts are calculated, but no signifi-
cance tests are performed, corrections for multiple comparisons
or calculations of effect sizes are not necessary. For visualization,
a threshold of 99.4% was applied to the probability maps.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
As expected, the frequency of sending the false message strongly
depends on a game’s category, i.e., on the distribution of pay-
offs (for a description of the stimulus-dependent categoriza-
tion please see Stimuli and Experimental Paradigm): it is fairly
low in the “aligned interest” category (25%, SD = 22.5) and in
“sender indifferent” (24.7%, SD = 23.2), but comparatively high
in “conflict” (60.8%, SD = 21.5) [F(2, 28) = 34.97, p = 0.0001].
Lying in the “conflict” category is significantly more frequent
than in either “aligned interest” or “sender indifferent,” whereas
we find no significant difference between the latter two categories.
Furthermore, the possible gains for the sender if the receiver picks
the state that is better for the sender, and the potential losses for
the receiver if she picks the state that is worse for her, have a sig-
nificant impact on the likelihood of sending the false message.
Senders lie more often when the potential gains from lying are
high (10C or 5C; 55.8%, SD = 19.2) than when they are low [1C
or 0C; 34.2%, SD = 17.2; t(29) = 6.1, p = 0.0001]. Senders lie
less often when the possible losses for the receiver are high (10C,
15C, or 20C; 37.4%, SD = 20.3) than when they are low [1C or
5C; 47.2%, SD = 13.3; t(29) = −4.04, p = 0.0001]. These results
clearly indicate that monetary incentives affect the frequency of
sending the false message.
The relative frequency of sophisticated deception (as a fraction
of the total number of cases in which the sender sent the objec-
tively truemessage) depends on a game’s category in the same way
the frequency of simple deception does. In the category “conflict,”
we observe sophisticated deception in 59.3% (SD = 31.5) of cases
with true messages, whereas we observe it significantly less often
in “sender indifferent” (40.9%, SD = 28.6) and “aligned interest”
[31.7%, SD = 19.1; F(2, 26) = 14.98, p = 0.0001]. This finding
indicates sophisticated deception through telling the truth is most
likely when the sender can profit most from it. Adding the cases of
sophisticated deception to the cases of simple deception, the over-
all frequency of deception reaches 65.9% (SD = 18.9) across all
categories, whereas it is only 42.8% (SD = 15.3) when taking into
account only plain lies and ignoring deceptive behavior through
truth telling.
Our assumption that truth telling may be less demanding than
deceiving the interaction partner was confirmed for both sorts
of lying: Telling a plain lie (M = 2618ms, SD = 202) or engaging
in sophisticated deception (M = 2611ms, SD = 193)—while not
significantly different from each other—takes significantly longer
than telling the truth (M = 2453ms, SD = 211) [F(2, 30) = 3.46,
p = 0.044]. This response pattern is crucially affected by the
actual payoffs: A 3 (category)× 3 (response (truth, SD, plain lies))
repeatedmeasures ANOVA reveals a significant main effect of cat-
egory [F(2, 30) = 6.44, p = 0.005], with “conflict” trials showing
the longest RTs (M = 2720ms, SD = 211) followed by “sender
indifferent” trials (M = 2565ms, SD = 203) and “aligned inter-
est” trials (M = 2397ms, SD = 200) (cp. Table 2). We take these
results to support the notion that deceptive behavior, irrespective
of how it is expressed, demands additional cognitive processes so
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Table 2 | Reaction times (in ms) split by category (“aligned interest,”
“sender indifferent,” and “conflict,” please cp. section on stimuli and
experimental paradigm for more details) and deceptive behavior
[truth, sophisticated deception (SD), and plain lies].
as to suppress a pre-potent truthful answer. This is also supported
by our post-session questionnaire data: senders report that it took
them significantly longer to respond when stakes were high and
that they had to deliberate harder when preparing to deceive the
receiver.
Additional results from the post-session questionnaire data
reveal insights regarding strategy and heterogeneity. Concerning
the former, 86.6% of the senders report having developed a strat-
egy how to interact with the receiver and of those more than
half (59.9%) report that their strategy depended on the differ-
ence in payoffs between sender and receiver as well as on the
absolute amounts. The remaining senders indicate to have taken
into account the frequency and succession of previous blue-
and red-responses so as to determine how to respond. We take
these findings to indicate that senders engaged, indeed, in our
social interactive paradigm and cared about the actual payoffs.
Concerning the issue of heterogeneity, the data display a het-
erogeneous sample. Being asked on how many of the trials they
produced a deceptive response, senders on average say that they
did so in 43.8% (SD = 23) of the cases, the range being 5–
90%. A closer look reveals that 36.6% of the senders have had
a bad conscience when producing a deceptive response (with the
feeling even persisting for a couple of trials) and feel that they
had lied in effect. These senders indicate to have lied in only a
third of the trials (M = 33.4%, SD = 21.6). In contrast, the other
senders (63.3%) report not having had a feeling of actually lying,
and thus indicate having lied in approximately half of the trials
[M = 49.7%, SD = 22.1, t(28) = −1.95, p = 0.06 (2-tailed)].
IMAGING RESULTS
Neural correlates of the intention to deceive in strategic
interactions (simple and sophisticated deception> truth)
To study the neural correlates of the intention to deceive, we con-
trast the hemodynamic activation of simple deception trials and
sophisticated deception trials with truth trials and find activation
within the right TPJ, superior temporal gyrus, precuneus extend-
ing into the retrosplenial cortex, cuneus bilaterally, and within the
right superior frontal gyrus (BA 10) (see Table 3 and Figure 2,
upper panel).
Table 3 | Intention to deceive in strategic interactions: laterality,
anatomical specification, Talairach coordinates (x, y, z), posterior
probabilities, and size (mm3) for activations according to Bayesian
analysis are shown for the contrast simple deception and
sophisticated deception trials vs. truth trials.
Brain region x y z Max mm3
R. Temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) 55 −42 17 99.92 108
R. Superior temporal gyrus 43 −27 6 99.99 270
R. Precuneus 6 −51 48 99.99 648
Extending into the retrosplenial
cortex
6 −57 20 99.97 189
R. Cuneus 6 −72 −2 99.97 162
−9 −81 15 99.99 783
−3 −69 9 99.96 189
R. Superior frontal gyrus (BA 10) 35 57 −2 99.99 216
Neural correlates of lying in strategic interactions (simple
deception> truth)
To study the neural correlates of simple deception, i.e., sending
a false message with the intention to deceive, we contrast the
hemodynamic activation of simple deception trials with truth
trials and find activation within the right TPJ, the dorsal ACC,
the precuneus extending into the retrosplenial cortex, within the
cuneus, the right anterior frontal gyrus (aFG), and a compara-
tively small activation focus within the anterior medial prefrontal
cortex (amPFC) (see Table 4 and Figure 3, upper panel).
Neural correlates of sophisticated deception (sophisticated
deception> truth)
To study the neural correlates of sophisticated deception specifi-
cally, we built a contrast of sophisticated deception trials and truth
trials. We find activation within the right TPJ, the precuneus, the
left cuneus, the right aFG (BA 10), and the superior temporal
gyrus (see Table 5 and Figure 3, lower panel).
Importantly, this finding suggests sophisticated deception is
not a variant of plainly telling the truth—in which case no acti-
vation differences in this contrast should have occurred—but a
version of telling a lie, since a very similar activation pattern
occurred as in the contrast “simple deception vs. truth” (cp. upper
panel in Figure 3).
Neural correlates delineating the two forms of deception
(sophisticated deception> simple deception)
To test for the differences between the two forms of deception,
we contrasted sophisticated deception trials with simple decep-
tion trials. We find activation bilaterally within the TPJ, the right
middle temporal gyrus, the left superior temporal gyrus, the
left frontal operculum, and within the mid-cingulate gyrus (see
Table 6 and Figure 4, upper panel).
Neural correlates of genuine truth trials
Taking into account the sender’s true intention, we are able to
extract genuine truth trials, i.e., trials where the sender sent
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FIGURE 2 | Upper Panel: Intention to deceive in strategic interactions:
Results are shown for the contrast simple deception and
sophisticated deception trials vs. truth trials. Lower Panel: Telling the
truth: Results are shown for the contrast truth trials vs. simple
deception and sophisticated deception trials. Abbreviations: aFG,
anterior frontal gyrus; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; rTPJ, right
temporo-parietal junction. For visualization, a threshold of 99.4% was
applied to the probability maps.
Table 4 | Simple deception vs. truth: laterality, anatomical
specification, Talairach coordinates (x, y, z), posterior probabilities,
and size (mm3) for activations according to Bayesian analysis are
shown for the contrast simple deception trials vs. truth trials.
Brain region x y z Max mm3
R. Temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) 58 −42 17 99.98 648
R. Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 3 36 23 99.87 162
R. Precuneus 6 −54 48 99.99 540
Extending into the retrosplenial
cortex
6 −60 23 99.99
R. Cuneus 6 −90 15 99.99 6021
R. Superior frontal gyrus (BA 10) 14 60 17 99.96 243
35 57 −2 99.86 162
R. Anterior median prefrontal
cortex (amPFC)
6 54 4 99.87 108
the true message with the expectation that the receiver believes
her (true) message. These trials are contrasted with both simple
deception as well as sophisticated deception trials. We find acti-
vation within the habenular complex bilaterally, the right frontal
operculum, the left pregenual ACC, and the right middle frontal
gyrus (see Table 7 and Figure 2, lower panel).
Parametric analysis modeling the incentive to deceive for simple
deception trials
To test whether the activation that revealed for simple decep-
tion varies with the monetary incentive, we calculate a parametric
analysis. Responses are modeled by a value that reflects the ten-
sion between the sender’s and the receiver’s payoffs. It is calculated
as the product of the differences of the sender’s and the receiver’s
payoff for the pairs of states, i.e., (Sb – Sr) × (Rr – Rb) (cp.
MR Scanning Procedure). The posterior probability maps of this
parametric analysis reveals the anterior median prefrontal cor-
tex (amPFC), the dorsal ACC, and the aFG (BA 10) to be more
engaged the higher the conflict and thus the tension in payoffs
between sender and receiver (see Table 8 and Figure 4, lower
panel).
DISCUSSION
Many real life situations are characterized by informational asym-
metries among interacting parties. Obviously, such situations
may provide an incentive for either party to exploit the informa-
tional asymmetries to their own advantage. This may then imply
the use of deception. In this fMRI study we analyze the neural
foundations of deception in strategic interactions. Notably, in our
paradigm, interaction partners were free whether or not to lie.
Besides plain lying, we study a broader concept of deception by
looking at what has been called sophisticated deception (Sutter,
2009). Here, telling the truth is counted as an act of deception
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FIGURE 3 | Upper Panel: Simple Deception: Results are shown for the
contrast simple deception trials vs. truth trials. Lower Panel: Sophisticated
Deception: Results are shown for the contrast sophisticated deception trials
vs. truth trials. Abbreviations: aFG, anterior frontal gyrus; dACC, dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex; rTPJ, right temporo-parietal junction. For
visualization, a threshold of 99.4% was applied to the probability maps.
Table 5 | Sophisticated deception vs. truth: laterality, anatomical
specification, Talairach coordinates (x, y, z), posterior probabilities,
and size (mm3) for activations according to Bayesian analysis are
shown for the contrast sophisticated deception trials vs. truth trials.
Brain region x y z Max mm3
R. Temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) 55 −51 23 99.86 162
R. Precuneus 6 −54 50 99.99 1188
L. Cuneus −6 −81 15 99.99 1107
R. Superior frontal gyrus (BA 10) 32 57 1 99.91 216
R. Superior temporal gyrus 43 −27 6 99.86 162
when the sender expects the receiver not to follow the sender’s
(true) message. Moreover, by taking into account the sender’s true
intention, we can also determine the neural correlates of genuine
truth trials. All in all, we take our results to show that brain acti-
vation patterns can reveal the sender’s true intention (to deceive),
for instance when sending an objectively true message.
INTENTION TO DECEIVE
Particularly, our results reveal the rTPJ, the (pre)cuneus (CUN),
retrosplenial cortex, and aFG to be specifically involved for the
intention to deceive, irrespective of whether this is done by send-
ing a false or a true message. The finding of activation within
the rTPJ is in line with our hypothesis. Based on previous find-
ings and recent meta-analytic findings on deceptive behavior, we
Table 6 | Sophisticated deception vs. simple deception: laterality,
anatomical specification, Talairach coordinates (x, y, z), posterior
probabilities, and size (mm3) for activations according to Bayesian
analysis are shown for the contrast sophisticated deception trials vs.
simple deception trials.
Brain region x y z Max mm3
R. Temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) 43 −60 12 99.82 189
L. −55 −48 12 99.90 270
R. Middle temporal gyrus (MTG) 49 −27 −7 99.97 432
L. Superior temporal gyrus (STG) −55 0 −2 99.90 243
L. Insula −40 10 6 99.92 432
R. Mid-cingulate gyrus 6 0 42 99.98 432
suggest this activation to reflect socio-cognitive processes dur-
ing deception. Specifically, deceptive behavior crucially depends
on the ability to anticipate the receiver’s mental state. The rTPJ,
including posterior superior temporal and angular gyrus, have
repeatedly been shown to be specifically involved when people
have to integrate socially relevant information and to infer the
mental states of others (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Decety and
Grèzes, 2006; Saxe, 2006; Decety and Lamm, 2007; Bahnemann
et al., 2010). Thus, the finding of rTPJ activation for deceptive
behavior, realized either by telling a lie or telling the truth, is con-
sistent with our hypothesis on the intentional aspects of deception
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FIGURE 4 | Upper Panel: Delineating the two forms of deception: Results
are shown for the contrast sophisticated deception trials vs. simple
deception trials. Lower Panel: Parametric analysis modeling the incentive to
deceive for simple deception trials: Results are shown for the positive
correlational analysis, i.e., the activation is stronger the higher the conflict and
thus the tension in payoffs between sender and receiver. Abbreviations: aFG,
anterior frontal gyrus; amPFC, anterior median prefrontal cortex; dACC, dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex; lSTG, left superior temporal gyrus; lTPJ, left
temporo-parietal junction; MTG, middle temporal gyrus. For visualization, a
threshold of 99.4% was applied to the probability maps.
Table 7 | Truth vs. simple and sophisticated deception: laterality,
anatomical specification, Talairach coordinates (x, y, z), posterior
probabilities, and size (mm3) for activations according to Bayesian
analysis are shown for the contrast truth trials vs. simple deception
and sophisticated deception trials.
Brain region x y z Max mm3
R. Habenular complex 6 −33 6 99.97 81
L. −9 −30 6 99.86 108
R. Operculum 49 15 4 99.98 351
L. Pregenual anterior cingulate cortex −3 33 4 99.96 135
R. Middle frontal gyrus 41 36 20 99.92 108
in a social setting, in which the intentional states of others are
integrated into one’s own reasoning (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003;
Grèze et al., 2004; Walter et al., 2004; Perner et al., 2006; Saxe,
2009).
Activation within the cuneus, precuneus, and aFG were not
expected specifically but cuneus activation may reflect increased
requirements as to early visual processing (Vanni et al., 2001),
e.g., when thoroughly inspecting the payoff matrix, that is then
sent to several parietal areas (Fattori et al., 2009); precuneus acti-
vation may reflect increased episodic memory retrieval processes
(Cavanna and Trimble, 2006), for instance, retrieving past payoff
matrices and one’s choices in the sender-receiver game, as well
Table 8 | Parametric analysis modeling the incentive to deceive for
simple deception trials: laterality, anatomical specification, Talairach
coordinates (x, y, z), posterior probabilities, and size (mm3) for
activations according to Bayesian analysis are shown for the
parametric contrast modeling the tension between the sender’s and
receiver’s payoff in simple deception trials.
Brain region x y z Max mm3
R. Anterior median prefrontal
cortex (amPFC)
3 54 −5 99.96 297
R. Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 6 15 37 99.96 459
R. Middle frontal gyrus (BA 10) 35 42 12 99.97 378
as automatic social monitoring processes when observing inter-
acting people (Iacoboni et al., 2004; Leube et al., 2012; Vrticka
et al., 2013). And activation within the aFG may reflect the inte-
gration of the outcomes of two separate cognitive operations in
the pursuit of a higher goal (Ramnani and Owen, 2004).
DECEPTION THROUGH TELLING THE TRUTH (SOPHISTICATED
DECEPTION)
Notably, finding this activation pattern both for simple as well
as sophisticated deception trials, reveals that sophisticated decep-
tion, although superficially appearing as truth trials, cannot be
considered a variant of plainly telling the truth—in which case no
activation differences between sophisticated deception and truth
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trials should have occurred. Rather, the intention to deceive seems
to share a lot with deceptive behavior in terms of cognitive pro-
cesses. Sophisticated deception, as defined in the context of our
sender-receiver game, is a form of deception that crucially has to
take into account the receiver’s reasoning. The sender has to form
expectations about the receiver’s beliefs and has to adjust her own
actions accordingly. Hence, rTPJ activation becomes characteris-
tic for sophisticated deception. Based on this finding, we suggest
that brain activation can reveal the sender’s veridical intention
to deceive in the absence of overt lying. Accordingly, it seems
warranted not to confine deception simply to telling a lie.
Interestingly, sophisticated deception seems also to stand out
from simple deception. That is, trying to deceive the inter-
action partner by telling the truth requires greater processing
demands than simply telling a lie. Particularly, given activation
within the TPJ, lSTG, and MTG, we take this result to indicate
greater demands when reading or inferring the partner’s thoughts
and beliefs so as to correctly predict the receiver’s actions. That
is, sophisticated deception differs from plainly telling a lie by
heightened demands for ToM processes. Instead of construing
additional activation (for instance within the frontal gyrus), our
result may be understood as representing increasingly more com-
plex processing of the social situation in strategic interaction
(Bahnemann et al., 2010).
A further indication that simple and sophisticated deception
are two different forms of deceptive behavior come from the
parametric analysis. Only for simple deception trials part of the
respective network was modulated by the distribution of mon-
etary payoffs between sender and receiver. That is, activation
within the dorsal ACC, amPFC, and aFG correlated positively
the higher the conflict between sender’s and receiver’s payoffs.
Activation within the dACC has consistently been related to con-
flict detection and monitoring processes (Carter and van Veen,
2007), although “conflict monitoring may be just one facet of the
broader role of ACC in performance monitoring and the opti-
mization of behavior” (Yeung, 2014, p. 275). Carter and van Veen
(2007) suggested the ACC’s specific role is “to detect conflict
between simultaneous active, competing representations and to
engage the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) to resolve such
conflict” (p. 367). The greater involvement of this area for high
conflict trials when sending false messages may indicate greater
tension in situations where people resort to lying despite knowing
of the normative appeal to tell the truth.
GENUINE TRUTH TRIALS
By taking into account the sender’s veridical intention, we could
determine the neural correlates of genuine truth trials in the
present study. Hitherto, imaging studies on deceptive behavior
did not report any significant activation for telling the truth,
which could be due to truth trials being a heterogeneous cat-
egory in those studies, potentially also including sophisticated
deception trials. We found significant activation within the habe-
nular complex bilaterally and the left frontal operculum and
MTG. Based on animal research, the habenular complex has
been suggested to be specifically involved in the control of
the human reward system. For instance, the electrical stimu-
lation of the habenular nuclei resulted in an inhibition of up
to 90% of the dopamine neurons in the ventral tegmental area
and substantia nigra in rats (Christoph et al., 1986). In con-
trast, lesions to the habenular complex resulted in an “increased
dopamine turnover in the nucleus accumbens, striatum, and pre-
frontal cortex, reflecting an activation of the dopaminergic system
(Lisoprawski et al., 1980; Nishikawa et al., 1986)” (Ullsperger and
von Cramon, 2003, p. 4308). Based on these as well as anatomical
data, it has been suggested that the habenular complex serves as
a “critical modulatory relay between the limbic forebrain struc-
tures and the midbrain” (Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2003, p.
4309). Accordingly, habenular activation for telling the truth in
strategic interactions in the present study may reduce the proba-
bility of phasic dopamine release in the reward system, and thus
may reinforce truth telling through weakening the incentive of the
monetary profits.
In sum, our study provides a new paradigm for studying
the neural basis of deception in human interaction. Contrary
to previous studies with instructed deception in non-interactive
contexts, we have created a social interactive context based on
game-theoretic modeling. Importantly, we are the first to inves-
tigate the neural foundations of an intention to deceive in the
absence of overt lying. Such sophisticated deception through
telling the truth is an intriguing alternative to telling a plain lie,
and it can be strategically used, as in the Austrian writer Franz
Grillparzer’s comedy “Woe to him who is lying” in which the
young kitchen boy Leon frees his bishop’s captured nephew by
telling the guards he is going to free their hostage, and they let
him proceed because they don’t believe him.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Caroline Szymanski, Thomas Dratsch, Philipp
Euskirchen, Volker Neuschmelting, and LauraMega for program-
ming the experimental paradigm and for help in data analysis,
and Hilke Plassmann as well as three anonymous reviewers for
their helpful and constructive comments on an earlier draft of this
manuscript.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://www.frontiersin.org/journal/10.3389/fnbeh.
2015.00027/abstract
REFERENCES
Abe, N., Suzuki, M., Mori, E., Itoh, M., and Fujii, T. (2007). Deceiving others:
distinct neural responses of the prefrontal cortex and amygdala in simple fab-
rication and deception with social interactions. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 19, 287–295.
doi: 10.1162/jocn.2007.19.2.287
Amodio, D.M., and Frith, C. D. (2006). Meeting of minds: themedial frontal cortex
and social cognition. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 7, 268–277. doi: 10.1038/nrn1884
Bahnemann, M., Dziobek, I., Prehn, K., Wolf, I., and Heekeren, H. R. (2010).
Sociotopy in the temporoparietal cortex: common versus distinct processes. Soc.
Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 5, 48–58. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsp045
Baumgartner, T., Fischbacher, U., Feierabend, A., Lutz, K., and Fehr, E.
(2009). The neural circuitry of a broken promise. Neuron 64, 756–770. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2009.11.017
Birn, R. M., Cox, R. W., and Bandettini, P. A. (2002). Detection versus estimation
in event-related fMRI: choosing the optimal stimulus timing. Neuroimage 15,
252–264. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2001.0964
Carter, C. S., and van Veen, V. (2007). Anterior cingulate cortex and conflict detec-
tion: an update of theory and data. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 7, 367–379.
doi: 10.3758/CABN.7.4.367
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 27 | 10
Volz et al. The neural basis of deception in strategic interactions
Cavanna, A. E., and Trimble, M. R. (2006). The precuneus: a review of its
functional anatomy and behavioural correlates. Brain 129, 564–583. doi:
10.1093/brain/awl004
Christoph, G. R., Leonzio, R. J., and Wilcox, K. S. (1986). Stimulation of the lat-
eral habenula inhibits dopamine-containing neurons in the substantia nigra and
ventral tegemental area of the rat. J. Neurosci. 6, 613–619.
Crawford, V. P., and Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission.
Econometrica 50, 1431–1451. doi: 10.2307/1913390
Cui, Q., Vanman, E. J., Wei, D., Yang, W., Jia, L., and Zhang, Q. (2014). Detection
of deception based on fMRI activation patterns underlying the production of
a deceptive response and receiving feedback about the success of the decep-
tion after a mock murder crime. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 9, 1472–1480. doi:
10.1093/scan/nst134
Decety, J., and Grèzes, J. (2006). The power of simulation: imagining one’s own and
other’s behavior. Brain Res. 1079, 4–14. doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2005.12.115
Decety, J., and Lamm, C. (2007). The role of the right temporoparietal junc-
tion in social interaction: how low-level computational processes contribute
to meta-cognition. Neuroscientist 13, 580–593. doi: 10.1177/10738584073
04654
Fattori, P., Pitzalis, S., and Galletti, C. (2009). The cortical visual area
V6 in macaque and human brains. J. Physiol. Paris 103, 88–97. doi:
10.1016/j.jphysparis.2009.05.012
Friston, K. J., Holmes, A. P., Worsley, K. J., Poline, J. P., Frith, C. D., and Frackowiak,
R. S. J. (1995). Statistical parametric maps in functional imaging: a general
linear approach. Hum. Brain Mapp. 2, 189–210. doi: 10.1002/hbm.460020402
Frith, C. D. (2007). The social brain? Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 362,
671–678. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2006.2003
Frith, C. D., and Frith, U. (1999). Interacting minds – a biological basis. Science
286, 1692–1695. doi: 10.1126/science.286.5445.1692
Glover, G. H. (1999). Deconvolution of impulse response in event-related BOLD
fMRI. Neuroimage 9, 416–429. doi: 10.1006/nimg.1998.0419
Gneezy, U. (2005). Deception: the role of consequences. Am. Econ. Rev. 95,
384–394. doi: 10.1257/0002828053828662
Greene, J. D., and Paxton, J. M. (2009). Patterns of neural activity associated
with honest and dishonest moral decisions. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106,
12506–12511. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0900152106
Grèze, J., Frith, C. D., and Passingham, R. E. (2004). Infering false beliefs from
the actions of oneself and others: an fMRI study. Neuroimage 21, 744–750. doi:
10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00665-7
Grinband, J., Wager, T. D., Lindquist, M., Ferrera, V. P., and Hirsch, J. (2008).
Detection of time-varying signals in event-related fMRI designs. Neuroimage
15, 509–520. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.07.065
Iacoboni, M., Lieberman, M. D., Knowlton, B. J., Molnar-Szakacs, I., Moritz,
M., Throop, C. J., et al. (2004). Watching social interactions pro-
duces dorsomedial prefrontal and medial parietal BOLD fMRI signal
increases compared to a resting baseline. Neuroimage 21, 1167–1173. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2003.11.013
Lazar, N. (2008). The Statistical Analysis of Functional MRI Data. New York, NY:
Springer Verlag.
Leube, D., Straube, B., Green, A., Blumel, I., Prinz, S., Schlotterbeck, P., et al. (2012).
A possible brain network for representation of cooperative behavior and its
implications for the psychopathology of schizophrenia. Neuropsychobiology 66,
24–32. doi: 10.1159/000337131
Lisofsky, N., Kazzer, P., Heekeren, H. R., and Prehn, K. (2014).
Investigating socio-cognitive processes in deception: a quantitative meta-
analysis of neuroimaging studies. Neuropsychologia 61, 113–122. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.06.001
Lisoprawski, A., Herve, D., Blanc, G., Glowinski, J., and Tassin, J. P. (1980).
Selective activation of the mesocortico-frontal dopaminergic neurones induced
by lesions oft he habenula in the rat. Brain Res. 183, 229–234. doi: 10.1016/0006-
8993(80)90135-3
Lohmann, G., Muller, K., Bosch, V., Mentzel, H., Hessler, S., Chen, L., et al. (2001).
LIPSIA—a new software system for the evaluation of functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging of the human brain. Comput. Med. Imaging Graph. 25, 449–457.
doi: 10.1016/S0895-6111(01)00008-8
Miezin, F. M., Maccotta, L., Ollinger, J. M., Petersen, S. E., and Buckner, R. L.
(2000). Characterizing the hemodynamic response: effects of presentation rate,
sampling procedure, and the possibility of ordering brain activity based on their
relative timing. Neuroimage 11, 735–759. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2000.0568
Moriguchi, Y., Ohnishi, T., Lane, R. D., Maeda, M., Mori, T., Nemoto,
K., et al. (2006). Impaired self-awareness and theory of mind: an fMRI
study of mentalizing in alexithymia. Neuroimage 32, 1472–1482. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.04.186
Neumann, J., and Lohmann, G. (2003). Bayesian second-level analysis of functional
magnetic resonance images. Neuroimage 20, 1346–1355. doi: 10.1016/S1053-
8119(03)00443-9
Nishikawa, T., Fage, D., and Scatton, B. (1986). Evidence for and nature of the
tonic inhibitory influence of the habenulointerpenduncular pathway upon
cerebral dopaminergic transmission in the rat. Brain Res. 373, 323–336. doi:
10.1016/0006-8993(86)90347-1
Norris, D. G., Zysset, S., Mildner, T., and Wiggins, C. J. (2002). An investigation
of the value of spin-echo-based fMRI using a Stroop color-word matching task
and EPI at 3T. Neuroimage 15, 719–726. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2001.1005
Ojemann, J. G., Akbudak, E., Snyder, A. Z., McKinstry, R. C., Raichle, M. E., and
Conturo, T. E. (1997). Anatomic localization and quantitative analysis of gradi-
ent refocused echo-planar fMRI susceptibility artifacts.Neuroimage 6, 156–167.
doi: 10.1006/nimg.1997.0289
Olson, I. R., Plotzker, A., and Ezzyat, Y. (2007). The enigmatic temporal pole: a
review of findings on social and emotional processing. Brain 130, 1718–1731.
doi: 10.1093/brain/awm052
Perner, J., Aichhorn, M., Kronbichler, M., Staffen, W., and Ladurner, G.
(2006). Thinking of mental and other representations: the roles of
left and right temporo-parietal junction. Soc. Neurosci. 1, 245–258. doi:
10.1080/17470910600989896
Ramnani, N., and Owen, A. M. (2004). Anterior prefrontal cortex: insights into
function from anatomy and neuroimaging. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 5, 184–194. doi:
10.1038/nrn1343
Saxe, R. (2006). Uniquely human social cognition. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 16,
235–239. doi: 10.1016/j.conb.2006.03.001
Saxe, R. (2009). “Theory of mind (neural basis),” in Encyclopedia of Consciousness,
ed W. P. Banks (Waltham, MA: Academic Press), 401–409. doi: 10.1016/B978-
012373873-8.00078-5
Saxe, R., and Kanwisher, N. (2003). People thinking about thinking people. The
role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind.” Neuroimage 19,
1835–1842. doi: 10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00230-1
Schmidt, C. F., Boesiger, P., and Ishai, A. (2005). Comparison of fMRI activa-
tion as measured with gradient- and spin-echo EPI during visual perception.
Neuroimage 26, 852–859. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.02.043
Sip, K. E., Lynge, M., Wallentin, M., McGregor, W. B., Frith, C. D., and Roepstorff,
A. (2010). The production and detection of deception in an interactive game.
Neuropsychologia 48, 3619–3626. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.08.013
Sip, K. E., Roepstorff, A., McGregor, W., and Frith, C. D. (2008). Detecting
deception. The scope and limits. Trends Cogn. Sci. 12, 48–53. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2007.11.008
Smith, V. L. (1976). Experimental economics: induced value theory. Am. Econ. Rev.
66, 274–279.
Sutter, M. (2009). Deception through telling the truth?! Experimental evi-
dence from individuals and teams. Econ. J. 119, 47–60. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
0297.2008.02205.x
Thirion, B., Pinel, P., Mériaux, S., Roche, A., Dehaene, S., and Poline, J.-B.
(2007). Analysis of fMRI data sampled from large populations: statistical and
methodological issues. Neuroimage 35, 105–120. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.
2006.11.054
Ullsperger, M., and von Cramon, D. Y. (2003). Error monitoring using
external feedback: specific roles of the habenular complex, the reward
system, and the cingulate motor area revealed by functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging. J. Neurosci. 23, 4308–4314. Available online at:
http://www.jneurosci.org/content/23/10/4308.long
Vanni, S., Tanskanen, T., Seppä, M., Uutela, K., and Hari, R. (2001). Coinciding
early activation of the human primary visual cortex and anteromedial cuneus.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 98, 2776–2780. doi: 10.1073/pnas.041600898
Vogeley, K., Bussfeld, P., Newen, A., Herrmann, S., Happé, F., Falkai, P., et al. (2001).
Mind reading: neural mechanisms of theory of mind and self-perspective.
Neuroimage 14, 170–181. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2001.0789
Vrticka, P., Simioni, S., Fornari, E., Schluep, M., Vuilleumier, P., and Sander, D.
(2013). Neural substrates of social emotion regulation: a fMRI study on imita-
tion and expressive suppression to dynamic facial signals. Front. Psychol. 4:95.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00095
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 27 | 11
Volz et al. The neural basis of deception in strategic interactions
Walter, H., Adenzato, M., Ciaramidaro, A., Enrici, I., Pia, L., and Bara, B. G.
(2004). Understanding intentions in social interactions: the role of the anterior
paracingulate cortex. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 16, 1854–1863. doi: 10.1162/0898929042
947838
Wolf, I., Dziobek, I., and Heekeren, H. R. (2010). Neural correlates of social cog-
nition in naturalistic settings: a model-free analysis approach. Neuroimage 49,
894–904. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.08.060
Worsley, K. J., and Friston, K. J. (1995). Analysis of fMRI time-series revisited –
again. Neuroimage 2, 173–181. doi: 10.1006/nimg.1995.1023
Yeung, N. (2014). “Conflict monitoring and cognitive control,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Cognitive Neuroscience: Volume 2: The Cutting Edges, eds K. N.
Ochsner and S. Kosslyn (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 275–299. doi:
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199988709.013.0018
Zuckerman, M., DePaulo, B. M., and Rosenthal, R. (1981). “Verbal and nonverbal
communication of deception,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,
Vol. 14, ed L. Berkowitz (New York, NY: Academic Press), 1–59.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 30 September 2014; accepted: 27 January 2015; published online: 12
February 2015.
Citation: Volz KG, Vogeley K, Tittgemeyer M, von Cramon DY and Sutter M (2015)
The neural basis of deception in strategic interactions. Front. Behav. Neurosci. 9:27.
doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00027
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2015 Volz, Vogeley, Tittgemeyer, von Cramon and Sutter. This is an
open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publica-
tion in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 27 | 12
